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and, as such, was prohibited. 154 As a matter of constitutional
law, Tanya P. points out that the New York Equal Protection
Clause goes further than the Federal Equal Protection Clause, in
that it deems discrimination based on pregnancy gender
discrimination, thus subjecting it to review under intermediate
scrutiny.

RENSSELAER COUNTY
Jubic v. City of Troy City Corporation
(decided October 4, 1995)

55

Plaintiff, an applicant to become a municipal firefighter, passed
an open competitive examination for the position prior to
reaching the age of thirty-five, however, he was not offered the
position until after turning age thirty-five. 15 6 Plaintiff brought an
action against the municipality seeking an order stating that he
had been denied his right to equal protection under the New York
State157 and Federal Constitutions 158 when the municipality
refused to hire him. 159 The Supreme Court, Rensselaer County,
held that defendants' requirement, that firefighter applicants be
under the age of thirty-five in order to take the open competitive
examination, was not violative of the Federal Constitution or the

154. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
155. 166 Misc. 2d 326, 633 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County
1995).
156. Id. at 328, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
157. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state

or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color,
creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights
by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by
the state or any agency or subdivision of the state.
Id.

158. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
159. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 328, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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New York State Constitution. 160 The court determined that a

rational relationship existed to a legitimate governmental purpose

16 1
because firefighters must exert "extraordinary physical effort"
in the performance of their jobs and, as a result, a maximum age
162
limitation was permissible.

In 1991, before reaching age thirty-five, the plaintiff took a
firefighter examination in the City of Troy. 163 He passed the

exam, which was to be administered only to people who had not
yet turned thirty-five. 164 The exam notice stated that a candidate
could not be younger than nineteen nor older than thirty-five on
the date they took the written test. 165 The notice further stated
that a candidate would no longer be eligible for appointment once
166
he or she reached the age of thirty-five.
The plaintiff received a letter, dated May 31, 1994, which
stated that the Troy Civil Service Commission had determined
that he had qualified to become a firefighter. 167 The letter also
asked the plaintiff if he wanted to accept the position, and
plaintiff responded in the affirmative. 168 The plaintiff was then
160. Id. at 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
161. N.Y. CrV. SERV. LAw § 54 (McKinney 1958). This section states in
part:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary... neither the
state civil service department ...nor any municipal civil service

commission shall prohibit, prevent, disqualify, or discriminate against,
any person ...by reason of his or her age; and any such rule,
requirement, resolution, regulation or penalization shall be void.
Nothing herein contained, however, shall prevent the adoption of
reasonable minimum or maximum age requirements for open
competitive examinations for positions such as policeman, fireman,
prison guard, or other positions which require extraordinaryphysical
effort, except where age limits for such positions are already prescribed
by law.
Id. (emphasis added). This section, however, was later amended, effective July
6, 1994.
162. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 329, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
163. Id. at 327, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 327-28, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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formally offered the position in a letter from the Troy City
Manager dated July 1, 1994.169 However, as a condition
precedent to being hired, the letter stated that the plaintiff first
70
had to pass a physical fitness test and a physical examination. 1
The plaintiff returned the letter accepting the position and was
conditionally admitted to the firefighter's fitness test that was to
be administered on July 18, 1994.171 The admission was
conditional because the plaintiff had already attained the age of
thirty-five.1 72 The condition stipulated that if the Troy Civil
Service Commission did not change its regulation, which did not
allow a candidate to be appointed once he or she reached the age
of thirty-five, then the plaintiff would not be able to obtain an
appointment as a firefighter although he passed all preemployment tests. 173 At a subsequent meeting held on July 7,

1994, the Troy Civil Service Commission opted to keep the age
limitation in force. 174 In the interim, the plaintiff passed the
physical fitness test and the physical examination, but was not
allowed to begin serving as a firefighter. 175 Plaintiff then
instituted this action, claiming that the age restriction violated his
equal protection rights, that he was entitled to the appointment as
a firefighter with full seniority rights, and for attorney fees of
$10,000 for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.176
169. Id. at 328, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. V 1993). This subsection states in
pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
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In considering the plaintiff's argument that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated, the court
stated that "the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within
their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, but does not
prevent the States from making reasonable classifications among
persons." 177 Further, the court concluded that "[s]ince the
situation at bar does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental
right, it would appear that the rational basis standard of review is
appropriate to determine if the City's action violated the equal

protection clause."

17 8

In determining that rational basis was the appropriate standard
of review to apply, the court relied on the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia.17 9 In Murgia, the Supreme Court was

faced with the question of whether a state statute requiring a
"uniformed state police officer" to retire when he or she reached
fifty years of age violated the Equal Protection Clause. 180 The
Court stated that an "equal protection analysis requires strict
scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right

or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."

181

177. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723 (citing Western & S.
Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981)). In Western, the
Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether or not a tax scheme
implemented by the state of California, which imposed a higher tax burden on
foreign insurance companies than on insurance companies doing business in the
state, was constitutional. Western, 451 U.S. at 650. In determining that the
classification did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated that
there are situations where "subjects as to which foreign corporations may be
classified separately from both individuals and domestic corporations and dealt
with differently." Id. at 668. (quoting Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S.
490, 493-94 (1927)). In addition, the Court stated that the classification would
be appropriate as long as "the discrimination between foreign and domestic
corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose." Id.
178. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
179. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
180. Id. at 308.
181. Id. at 312.
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The Court determined that since the "right of governmental
employment

[is

not]

per se... fundamental" 1

2

and

a

classification based on age is not considered suspect, rational
basis was the appropriate standard of review to be applied.183
Pursuant to this reasoning, the court in Jubic declared that the

classification would be evaluated under rational basis scrutiny,
since the right at issue here also dealt with government
employment and the classification was based on age. 184 Hence,
no fundamental right or suspect class was present to trigger
185
heightened scrutiny.
In applying the rational basis test to the case at hand, the court
in Jubic relied on the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals in Matter of Figueroa v. Bronstein.186 In Figueroa, the
court had to determine whether a limitation placed on the age of
187
correction officer applicants violated the state constitution.
The court of appeals held that a minimum age requirement was

permissible,

because

correction

officers

must

exert

"extraordinary physical effort" in the performance of their
jobs. 188 The court declared that an age limitation would survive
constitutional scrutiny if it bore a rational relationship to a
182. Id. at 313.
183. Id. at 313-14.
184. Jubic v. City of Troy, 166 Misc. 2d 326, 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723
(Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1995). See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991). In Gregory, the Supreme Court determined that the provision in the
Missouri Constitution which required judges to retire at the age of 70, as
applied to certain judges, did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights
because a rational basis existed for making a distinction between judges under
age 70 and judges over 70 years of age. Id. at 473. The Court asserted that
"[i]n cases where a classification burdens neither a suspect group nor a
fundamental interest, 'courts are quite reluctant to overturn governmental
action on the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws.'" Id. at 470-71
(quoting Murgia, 501 U.S. at 314).
185. Id.
186. 38 N.Y.2d 533, 344 N.E.2d 402, 381 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1976).
187. Id. at 534, 344 N.E.2d at 403, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71.
188. Id. at 535, 344 N.E.2d at 403, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 471. The court
determined that it was permissible under the Constitution for respondents to
establish the age of 32 as a maximum. Id. at 535-36, 344 N.E.2d at 404, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 471
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legitimate governmental purpose. 189 The court determined that
drawing the line at age thirty-two was rationally related to the
governmental interest in assuring the physical ability of an
applicant to perform the duties of a corrections officer. 190

Further, the court maintained that it was rational for the
municipality to set the age limit so that the applicant would
remain qualified to serve for a long period of time. 191

Accordingly, the court in Jubic determined that under rational
basis review, the age limitation for firefighters imposed by the
defendants did not violate either the New York State or the
Federal Constitution because this type of employment also
required the same type of extraordinary physical stamina and
power. 192 The supreme court applied the same form of rational
basis review to evaluate both the federal and the state equal
193
protection claims.

In addition, in examining the question before it, the court
evaluated the relevant parts of section 54 of the Civil Service
Law. 194 The court concluded, generally, that the adoption of age
limitations by a municipality as an employment prerequisite is not
within the bounds of the law. 195 An exception to this rule,
189. Id. at 535, 344 N.E.2d at 403, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
190. Id. at 535, 344 N.E.2d at 403-04, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
191. Id. at 535, 344 N.E.2d at 404, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
192. Jubic v. City of Troy, 166 Misc. 2d 326, 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723
(Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1995). See Timerman v. Bence, 176 A.D.2d
1220, 576 N.Y.S.2d 714 (4th Dep't 1991). In Timernan, the Appellate
Division, Fourth Department, was faced with the question of whether the
plaintiff's equal protection rights were violated when he was denied
employment as a firefighter for being over 30 years old. Id. at 1221, 576
N.Y.S.2d at 715. In determining that there was no equal protection violation,
the court stated that the "age requirement for firefighters [is constitutional]
[b]ecause firefighters must exert 'extraordinary physical effort' in the
performance of their jobs." Id. In addition, the court reasoned that "[a]n age
limitation will survive constutional scrutiny if it bears a rational relationship to
a legitimate governmental purpose[,] [and] [d]rawing the line at age 30 is
rationally related to the governmental interest in assuring the physical ability of
an applicant to perform the duties of firefighter." Id. (citations omitted).
193. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 331, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
194. Id. at 328-29, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 722. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 54.
195. Jubic, 166 Misc. 2d at 329, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
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however, states that "reasonable requirements may be adopted
for open competitive examinations" when considering certain
positions, such as that of a firefighter. 196 There is no mention,
however, in Civil Service Law section 54, of the utilization of
age restrictions connected to selection for such employment after
the examination had been administered to the applicant. 197
Accordingly, the court concluded that such an age limitation, like
the one within the notice for the open competitive examination
for employment as a firefighter for the City of Troy, was
expressly void under section 54 of the Civil Service Law "to the
extent that it attempted to disqualify otherwise qualified
candidates for the firefighter position who attained age thirty-five
prior to the date of appointment." 198 The court stated that
although the Troy Civil Service Commission and the City of
Troy were permitted to implement "reasonable age restrictions"
when considering a candidate's fitness for participating in an
open competitive examination, they were not allowed to utilize
any other age constraints. 199
According to the rationale of the court, the plaintiff's right to
equal treatment under the law was offered no greater protection
under the New York State Constitution than under the Federal
Constitution. The supreme court applied the same level of
rational basis review to both the state and federal equal protection
claims. The court relied on the holding of the New York Court of
Appeals in Matter of Figueroav. Bronstein,200 which stands for
the proposition, consistent under both Federal and New York
State Constitutions, that a rational relationship existed between
the legislation imposing an age limitation on open competitive
examinations for firefighters and the legitimate governmental
purpose of assuring the physical ability of an applicant to perform
the duties of a firefighter.

196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 330, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723.

199. Id. at 330-31, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
200. 38 N.Y.2d 533, 344 N.E.2d 402, 381 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1976).
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